DIALOGUE/ Takeshi Yoro and Tatsuru Uchida: We must grasp problems posed by the 3/11 quake

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The March 11 earthquake and tsunami left immeasurable scars across northeastern Japan on an unprecedented scale. What questions did the catastrophic disaster and the ensuing accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant put before us? Takeshi Yoro, who has faced many deaths as an anatomist, and Tatsuru Uchida, a scholar of French literature who experienced the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, exchanged views based on unique perspectives.

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DIALOGUE/ Takeshi Yoro and Tatsuru Uchida: We must grasp problems posed by the 3/11 quake
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The March 11 earthquake and tsunami left immeasurable scars across northeastern Japan on an unprecedented scale. What questions did the catastrophic disaster and the ensuing accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant put before us? Takeshi Yoro, who has faced many deaths as an anatomist, and Tatsuru Uchida, a scholar of French literature who experienced the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, exchanged views based on unique perspectives.

Excerpts from a dialogue with them follow:

* * *

Tatsuru Uchida: When the Great East Japan Earthquake hit, I was on my way to Naoetsu, Niigata Prefecture, after a skiing trip in Nozawa Onsen resort, Nagano Prefecture. Since the JR Hokuriku Honsen line was paralyzed, I stayed overnight in Naoetsu, where I was awakened at midnight by a strong quake that had its epicenter in Nagano Prefecture. The following day, I went to Osaka by way of Toyama.

Takeshi Yoro: I had just arrived home in Kamakura, Kanagawa Prefecture. First, the light went out and then it started to tremble. I don't know the exact seismic intensity of the earthquake but the movement was slow and made me kind of dizzy.

Uchida: I experienced the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake in Ashiya, Hyogo Prefecture. At the time, I was impressed with the unexpectedly high level of social awareness of citizens. I had never thought local communities would function so properly. Before any guidance from local governments, some of the residents naturally started to organize relief activities and demonstrated soft leadership. I thought the Japanese are not completely hopeless, after all. This time, too, I had the same impression.

I see few angry people raising their voices, trying to put the blame on authorities or demonstrate false cheerfulness in an attempt to encourage others. It seems everyone is quietly looking at reality in the face. My impression is based on TV reports, which may be focusing on such calm persons. Despite the gravity of the disaster, people do not appear devastated. I get the impression they are maintaining their presence of mind and standing firm.

Yoro: I think it has to do with the fact that the earthquake and tsunami mainly hit the Tohoku region. The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake directly hit the administrative functions of the capital while the Great Hanshin Earthquake caused extensive damage on citizens. The earthquake this time is in between or has both aspects.

Uchida: The survivors are desperately enduring hardships but transportation networks have been severed, relief activities are not properly organized and distribution of supplies is slow. I think the fragility of regional transportation infrastructure and public facilities shows that the region has been left out in the cold by the central government for a long time. In that sense, I think Tohoku people are mentally strong. The region had been hit by major tsunami during the Meiji (1868-1912) and Showa (1926-1989) eras, but each time, the residents silently put up with the damage. I know because my father comes from Yamagata Prefecture (in the region) and I have Tohoku blood. Since they lost the Boshin War (1868-1869 civil war against the Meiji government), Tohoku people have been treated badly by the central government. I believe the history of cold treatment that has continued from the Meiji Restoration has had a major impact on the mentality of Tohoku people.

This time, the initial response of the administration of Naoto Kan was poor and it is clear it lacks crisis management ability. Still, we don't hear sound criticism from the stricken areas rapping the government for not doing its job properly. Instead, for now, the survivors are trying to get back on their feet with what little they have left. I feel that such independent mindset and the lack of expectation for the central government are two sides of the same coin.

Yoro: Ironically, the Tohoku region has been traditionally prone to famine. The great Tenmei famine (1782-1788) is well known as the greatest famine in modern times. This time, again, the region suffered serious damage. Japanese people demonstrate their strength after a crisis. They are very much used to natural disasters. On the other hand, they are very weak when it comes to averting crises. I strongly felt this point with regard to the accident at Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. While the earthquake was a natural disaster, the nuclear accident was man-made. They are completely different.

Uchida: I agree. When we talk about the two in the same context, it leads to confusion. Natural disasters may cause everyday life to fall apart. Still, one of Japanese strengths is the way we observe daily order and do not resort to such unruly behavior as looting and violence. But in man-made disasters like the Fukushima nuclear accident, such attitude could backfire. Even though a situation that cannot be dealt with in a regular way is happening, we tend to try to stick to manuals and routinely deal with it. As a result, I think such an attitude aggravated the crisis.

It is also hard to believe that emergency and regular power sources were both installed next to each other facing the ocean. As long as one is meant for emergencies, it should be installed on a hill some distance from the ocean or buried underground. That is the basic of hedging risks, isn't it? It's an idea anyone can come up with.

Yoro: Today, some cellphones can work even after they are thrown into water. Why don't power sources in nuclear power plants work when they are flooded? This is serious negligence. After all, (plant operator) Tokyo Electric Power Co. is a company that specializes in electric power supply.

Uchida: The fact that the power supply system was the first to go down within the overall system of a power company shows how seriously ill the company is.

Yoro: While we were debating about the safety of atomic energy, it turned out that the crux of the matter was "a lie." In a sense, the debate itself stood in the way of important work. In this age of advanced technology, there must be the know-how to build a plant that won't be affected by flooding. The operator scrimped on such technology and neglected safety in the true sense.

Uchida: Unwittingly, I think TEPCO tried to show there is no risk by not hedging against risks. When building the plant, some people must have insisted on separating the emergency power supply and installing it somewhere totally safe. I'm sure of it. But such a realistic proposal must have been squashed by people with authority who claimed that situations that require the use of emergency power supply would never happen and if they implemented the proposal, it would be tantamount to admitting that the plant could be dangerous. If scholars voiced their skepticism about nuclear power generation, they were required to present proposals to make it safer. As a result, they were criticized by opponents of nuclear power for supporting it under disguise. I think people who had realistic perceptions about the danger of nuclear energy were structurally eliminated from nuclear power plants.

Yoro: It may sound harsh but consequently, I think both sides jointly cut corners. That is why I don't like politics. When it comes to problems that concern everyday life, we do not think about the problems in terms of ideology as a supporter or an opponent.

Uchida: Specialists in the truest sense should have been involved. By that, I mean specialists who had nothing to do with politics or the market and regardless of whether they were for or against nuclear power but who could have concentrated on how to minimize risks of existing nuclear power plants. It is my view that if such specialists had firmly stood by the assertion that safety could not be guaranteed unless such and such measures were taken, regardless of cost or opinions of politicians--if such specialists had overseen nuclear power administration, the current situation would not have developed.

Yoro: Incidentally, I have always felt that the impact of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake on Japanese modern history has not been properly studied. In particular, it is said that 40,000 to 50,000 people who escaped to the site of a former military clothing factory in Tokyo's Sumida Ward died in a fire that engulfed Tokyo after the earthquake. It once hit me that the disaster had a serious impact on the depths of the Japanese psyche and caused Japanese history to take a sudden turn since then. It is a kind of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Uchida: A large number of occultists such as clairvoyants started to emerge in the late Taisho Era (1912-1926). It is possible that the Great Kanto Earthquake had something to do with it. After all, it is psychologically natural for occultism to emerge with a feeling of helplessness toward science and technology.

Yoro: Because the quake damage was so intense, people must have become insensitive to the ravages of war. At the time, the mood was happy-go-lucky. I couldn't understand why Japan rapidly inclined toward militarism. But when I think about the Great Kanto Earthquake, I cannot help but feel they are strongly interconnected. I am worried that such "special circumstances" could occur this time, too.

Uchida: But what went down with the nuclear accident this time is public trust not toward science and technology itself but toward "Japanese-style brains" who have been controlling it. Brains always try to come up with the right answer. That is why they cannot make grave decisions on their own unless they are shown evidence and presented with prepared excuses to give when they fail. They have a pathological fear of being held accountable when they jump the gun and fail. Rather than taking such a risk, they quietly "freeze" and wait until they receive instructions from upper organizations.

But this time, TEPCO officials had to make decisions on their own on the spot without waiting to be told what to do. Under such circumstances, brains always miss the chance to make decisions.

Initially, when the plant was damaged by the tsunami, I think one or more of the engineering staff proposed to consider the option to pour seawater into the troubled reactors and decommission them. Instead, I suppose, the brains opted to wait for instructions from the management and took no action. As a result, the disaster grew and got out of control. The fact that no one at any level had the courage and determination to take the blame gave rise to this catastrophe.

Yoro: This time, too, it was unfortunate that the situation could not be dealt with by those on the spot. Whether right or wrong, people on the spot are required to make decisions and move forward. There is no time to provide explanations. That is why it is almost meaningless to watch developments on television. The problem is how officials on site make decisions.

Another thing that is needed is comprehensive rationality. If a nuclear accident causes so much damage on everyday life, it makes no difference whether we have nuclear power plants or not because they are not working. Then why did we take the cost and trouble to build them?

Uchida: Shifting from thermal power generation to cleaner nuclear energy is part of the campaign to fight global warming that you have always criticized, isn't it?

Yoro: The first one to talk about global warming was an American scholar of nuclear power generation. Global warming was cited conveniently to promote nuclear power generation. But globally speaking, circulation of substances is basically stable. For example, when carbon dioxide increases, the ecosystem will automatically work to decrease density of carbon dioxide as a whole. When temperatures rise, the speed of photosynthesis increases and naturally, plants thrive (to absorb more carbon dioxide). As long as one basically understands such logic, it doesn't matter if rationality is partially undermined. It seems people who don't have such "reassurance" drastically increased. In terms of nuclear power generation, it comes down to how much energy we need. This is not a simple question because energy consumption and economic growth go hand in hand. Under the current system, boosting the economy and saving energy contradict each other.

Uchida: Themes of panic movies boil down to the question: "Money and life, which is more important?" Take, for example, the (1975) movie "Jaws," directed by Steven Spielberg. When the police chief of a summer resort island tries to evacuate beachgoers to protect them from a giant man-eating shark, the mayor, who only thinks in terms of economic rationality, overrules the police and declares the beach safe for fear of losing tourists, only to allow the shark to feast on them. What if we substitute the shark for nuclear power plants and the mayor for proponents of nuclear energy?

Yoro: That is exactly what is happening now in Fukushima. After all, we only seem to focus on partial rationality.

Uchida: All sciences developed from how to face catastrophic situations. Science is about forced rationality and inevitable logic. Since it is impossible to completely predict and control nature, we must think how to compromise with it. Since scientists have to be realists, they would never say anything is "absolutely safe." Realists and scientists in the real sense are people who gather everything they can get to prepare for any situation, catastrophic or not.

Yoro: As far as nuclear power generation is concerned, that was not the case.

Uchida: I recently wrote about "recommendation for evacuation" on my blog. Subjectively, we don't want damage from the nuclear accident to spread any further. But we must not mix our wish with the objective judgment that the worst-case scenario may materialize. Now is the time to give first consideration to objective judgment rather than subjective desire. I wrote in my blog that when we imagine what panic would happen if radioactive substances start to spread extensively, infants, pregnant women, the elderly and sick people should take evasive action as soon as possible "before a panic happens." The blog was harshly criticized. What surprised me the most was the protest that "if Tokyo residents escape toward west at a time when business is bad, it would slow down consumption and hurt the economy." It's shocking that some people are more concerned about money than human lives.

Yoro: Even if consumption in Tokyo declines, the decline can be offset if consumption rises in Osaka. That is what I mean by comprehensive rationality. In reality, I think the Japanese are mentally stronger than foreigners when it comes to radiation. Foreigners are far more frightened because they don't know how scary it is. When I was a child, rain contaminated with radioactive substances was falling because of nuclear tests by the former Soviet Union and the United States. While we were told to be careful, we had also dealt with it. Japan experienced the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that produced so many "hibakusha" survivors, yet we restored the two cities.

Uchida: Be that as it may, it's sad that the prime minister is totally incapable of demonstrating leadership. On the Internet, some people were quick to call for the emergence of someone like former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Although I don't know what he would have done if he were prime minister now, I think his initial responses would have been much quicker. While there are views for and against him, it seems everyone feels the need for "a strongman" at a time like this. A strongman can bulldoze his way because of the cooperation of the people who feel indebted to him. In a possible scenario, expectations will grow on Ichiro Ozawa to lead the nation partly because he is from quake-hit Iwate Prefecture. I think the administration had Yoshito Sengoku assume the post of deputy chief Cabinet secretary because Ozawa and Sengoku are the only strongmen in the ruling Democratic Party of Japan who can quash resistance of brains.

Yoro: Speaking of restoration, even in tsunami-stricken areas, survivors say they want to rebuild their community in the same place. Like Ise Grand Shrine in Ise, Mie Prefecture, which is rebuilt every 20 years, it is Japanese culture to reconstruct the same buildings in the same place. That is why no matter what tsunami or other disasters hit, people want to rebuild their communities where they used to be. As an outsider, I would advise them to build their homes in higher places but ports have to be by the ocean.

Uchida: Emotionally, I can understand the feelings of people who want to live where they used to live, and I think we should support them. In Kansai, too, I think ordinary citizens' willingness to support people in the stricken areas is very strong. Also in Kobe College where I had taught, a donation campaign was immediately launched. The school also decided to accept students from stricken areas.

Yoro: After all, we have no choice but to think about what questions the Great East Japan Earthquake poses to us. But when starting to think about it, people these days find themselves at a loss. In the end, I think it comes down to education. As a longtime scholar of natural history, I feel that few people today understand what it means to observe nature. This is because Japan adopted American-style education that aims at problem solving. But when we deal with nature, we must carefully observe it and think. Personally, I think nature provides us with "answers" from the beginning. What we don't understand are "problems."

Let me cite how leaves grow from trees as an example. They grow on trees so that each tree can get as much sunshine as possible. Since trees arrange leaves for that purpose, they never put leaves to overlap each other. Perhaps a computer can calculate efficiencies and come up with many answers. But the "answer" that leaves are arranged so that they can get as much sunshine as possible is there from the beginning. We know the answer because leaves actually do not overlap.

Uchida: You are saying that reality in front of us is not "a problem" but "an answer" that has already been given us.

Yoro: The question what people live for is meaningless because life is "answers" to the various problems we come across. The same thing can be said of the Great East Japan Earthquake. A catastrophic earthquake that occurs once in a millennium hit and the results are before us. The fact that survivors continue to live remains the same. The question is, what is it that the earthquake is addressing us to do.

* * *

Tatsuru Uchida is a scholar specializing in French literature. He served as a Kobe College professor of modern French thought until March and is currently a professor emeritus of the college. He survived the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake.

* * *

Takeshi Yoro is an anatomist. He is also a best-selling writer and commentator who covers extensive areas, including scientific philosophy, social problems and literary criticism.

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