U.S. evacuation orders in the early stage of the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant were based on the mistaken assumption that a spent fuel rod pool had dried up, documents showed.
U.S. evacuation orders in the early stage of the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant were based on the mistaken assumption that a spent fuel rod pool had dried up, documents showed.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on Feb. 21 released the conversations of staff members and related people at meetings and in telephone calls during the 10 days from March 11, 2011, when the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami crippled the plant.
According to the “Official Transcript of Proceedings,” NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko feared that meltdowns had occurred in the No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 reactors at the plant, operated by Tokyo Electric Power Co.
NRC staff on March 16 also assumed that the walls of the spent fuel pool at the No. 4 reactor had been lost in an explosion, leading to a loss of water, the exposure of fuel rods to air, and the release of a large volume of radioactive materials, according to the documents.
Jaczko also expressed concerns about the situation at the spent fuel pool of the No. 4 reactor.
On March 16, Jaczko accepted an NRC executive’s opinion that, if a similar accident were to occur in the United States, people living within a radius of 80 kilometers of the plant would be required to evacuate the area.
Jaczko later held discussions with others on advising John Roos, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, to issue a recommendation that U.S. citizens living within 80 km of the Fukushima nuclear plant leave the area.
The documents also showed that U.S. government officials repeatedly asked Shunsuke Kondo, chairman of the Japanese government’s Atomic Energy Commission, about the spent fuel pool of the No. 4 reactor.
Kondo never said the fuel rods in the pool were exposed.
Jaczko was correct about the meltdowns in the No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 reactors. However, TEPCO confirmed that the spent fuel pool in the No. 4 reactor was not seriously damaged and that water had not been lost.
On March 16, the Japanese government was already requiring residents to leave areas within 20 km of the nuclear plant. It also advised people living between 20 and 30 km of the plant to remain indoors.
Some NRC employees visited Japan and took part in meetings at TEPCO’s head office in Tokyo.
In one of the meetings, a participant proposed dropping sand into the spent fuel pool instead of water. But an NRC staff member reported later, “The simple, obvious answer, of course, is water, water, water.”
Some proposed that if the situation were to deteriorate further, evacuation orders for U.S. citizens would have to cover a much wider area than the 80-km zone. Others raised concerns about the effects of the nuclear accident on Hawaii or Alaska.
Jaczko rejected the idea that the crisis would have such a far-reaching influence.
The “Official Transcript of Proceedings” consists of more than 3,000 pages.
The Japanese government’s headquarters dealing with the nuclear crisis, meanwhile, has not worked out transcripts of its proceedings or even their summaries.
“It is extremely regrettable,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura said at a news conference on Feb. 22, referring to the lack of transcripts.
However, he said the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency will compile documents on the contents of its meetings in February and release them by around the middle of next week.
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The entire “Official Transcript of Proceedings” is available at (
A recording of the proceedings can be heard at (