As the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant accident spiraled out of control last March, the Japanese government’s disaster response teetered between haphazard micromanagement by the prime minister and poorly thought out stop-gap measures by subordinates, according to a nongovernment panel.
As the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant accident spiraled out of control last March, the Japanese government’s disaster response teetered between haphazard micromanagement by the prime minister and poorly thought out stop-gap measures by subordinates, according to a nongovernment panel.
An investigation under the auspices of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, headed by Yoichi Funabashi, the former editor in chief of The Asahi Shimbun, and conducted by a committee of 30 experts led by Koichi Kitazawa, a former chairman of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, revealed sometimes extraordinary scenes in the critical days following the Great East Japan Earthquake.
On the night of March 11, when Fukushima plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. sent generator vehicles to provide the crucial electricity needed to get emergency response systems running in the blacked-out plant, no one thought to bring along connecting cords, according to the committee’s report published Feb. 27.
Naoto Kan, prime minister at the time, was sometimes drawn into meddling with small details of the disaster response. When officials learned that replacement batteries were needed at the nuclear plant, Kan got out his mobile and called the official directly in charge.
The report quotes Kan as saying: "How large is the battery that you need? What are the dimensions? Weight? Can it be transported by helicopter?"
One participant who overheard the exchange told the investigative committee: "I became somewhat frightened when I thought about whether it was good for the nation to have the prime minister looking into such details."
At a news conference on Feb. 28, Kitazawa was critical of Kan’s tendency to micromanage, saying it exacerbated confusion among officials in a situation in which trust was breaking down between the Prime Minister's Official Residence, Tokyo Electric Power Co. and nuclear regulatory agencies.
"There was an obvious excessive interference with what was being done in Fukushima by the efforts to have the Prime Minister's Official Residence take charge," Kitazawa said. "Almost all of those efforts were not effective."
When Kan took a helicopter to the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, he was accompanied by Haruki Madarame, chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan. Kan told Madarame: "I know the fundamental aspects of this accident. Answer my questions."
Madarame told the investigative committee that, while he wanted to pass on more information to Kan, it was not easy. He said: "It would take someone with a very stout heart to be able to say anything energetically in a loud voice in front of Prime Minister Kan."
Masao Yoshida, then head of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, was also troubled by Kan's sudden visit.
He had a sharp exchange in a teleconference with TEPCO headquarters, asking: "What will come out of having me deal with the prime minister?"
The report praised Kan for putting pressure on TEPCO executives to stick to the task at hand. For example, between late March 14 and March 15, Masataka Shimizu, then TEPCO's president, asked the Prime Minister's Official Residence to allow the utility to evacuate all workers at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant.
Kan told Shimizu that was totally unacceptable and went to TEPCO headquarters to establish a joint response headquarters that also involved government officials.
But Kitazawa told the Feb. 28 news conference that Kan had also been a disruptive influence, sometimes obstructing the smooth transmission of information and interfering in decisions better made on the ground.
"He cannot be given a passing grade from the overall perspective of his handling of the crisis," Kitazawa said.
Kan issued a statement through his office on Feb. 28, saying: "The most serious aspect of the nuclear accident was the moves by TEPCO to try to evacuate from Fukushima that emerged from early on March 15. I feel grateful for the fair appraisal that was made."
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who received the report on Feb. 28, said: "Because we will have to spend a great deal of time with the nuclear accident, we will have to think about what can be done to prevent such things from happening again."