OKUMA, Fukushima Prefecture--Signs of a hasty retreat remained at an off-site center that failed to perform its functions in dealing with the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
OKUMA, Fukushima Prefecture--Signs of a hasty retreat remained at an off-site center that failed to perform its functions in dealing with the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
The two-story center, located 5 kilometers southwest of the plant, was opened to reporters on March 2 for the first time since the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami triggered the nuclear crisis on March 11 last year.
The center had been set up to serve as the “front-line headquarters” to handle nuclear crises. But all of the 100 or so staff members pulled out of the facility within five days of the start of the disaster because communication equipment became unusable and radiation levels rose.
When reporters entered a meeting space on the second floor of the building, iodine tablets in boxes and many bottles of water were still on the tables. Some of the bottles were half full, showing that the staff members left the building in a hurry.
Blankets were found in the corners of the room. Staff members slept at the center by placing their heads on their desks.
Some messages related to evacuations remained on whiteboards. One message read, “March 12, 5:44 (a.m.); evacuation within a radius of 10 kilometers; instruction from the prime minister.” Another read, “Okuma (town) residents, Miyakoji junior high school.”
On a whiteboard of the “plant group,” which was in charge of grasping the situation at the Fukushima nuclear plant, a message read, “March 14, 11:01 (a.m.), 3u explosion (details unknown).” That was the time when a hydrogen explosion hit the No. 3 reactor building.
Off-site centers were set up at 20 locations throughout the country after a nuclear accident occurred at a fuel processing facility operated by JCO in Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, in 1999, killing two people.
When the Great East Japan Earthquake struck on March 11, problems arose with the emergency electric sources at the center. Although the electricity supply was resumed the following day, the communication equipment remained unusable, including a video-conferencing system that connects the center with the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
In addition, the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), which predicts the flow of radioactive materials, failed to work.
Two large monitors, microphones and dozens of personal computers also remained at the center.
The government’s Nuclear Safety Commission is considering several measures to ensure these centers function during emergencies, including building them more than 30 kilometers from nuclear power plants.