A Diet committee will try to determine who is telling the truth about a key phase in
A Diet committee will try to determine who is telling the truth about a key phase in The issue concerns disturbing allegations from politicians that TEPCO wanted to abandon the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant during the early stages of the disaster last year, a move that could have exacerbated the crisis.TEPCO has vehemently denied the company had any plans to desert the stricken plant. But from May 17, politicians will be summoned to the Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission to give their side of the story.The central government's Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations and TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Accidents Investigation Committee have released interim reports about their respective efforts in dealing with the nuclear disaster. The private-sector Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident also released its final report in late February.All three accounts have differing interpretations of what transpired between TEPCO executives and government officials between the night of March 14 and early morning of March 15 of last year.TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata told the Diet panel on May 14 that there were never any consultations between TEPCO officials and government officials about evacuating all workers from the Fukushima No. 1 plant."In the evening of March 14, there was discussion about whether those workers not directly involved in work to restore operations should be evacuated," Katsumata said.The chairman’s explanation of the talks between TEPCO and central government officials was in line with an appendix attached to the TEPCO panel's interim report released last December."The gist of the exchange was: 'Because the situation at the plant is difficult, we want consideration to be given to temporarily evacuating workers who are not directly involved in the work when that need arises.' We never thought about (total withdrawal) nor asked that all workers be allowed to leave," the appendix said.But the report by the private-sector panel had a different view: “Considering the fact that many officials in the prime minister's office took the TEPCO request to mean it wanted all workers pulled out, it is difficult to state there was sufficient basis to support TEPCO's argument."The private-sector panel report described how Masataka Shimizu, TEPCO's president at the time, made calls to Banri Kaieda, then the industry minister, and then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano to discuss the possibility of pulling the workers out.According to the report, Shimizu told Edano: "Something has to be done. The on-site situation cannot be maintained much longer."The central government panel’s interim report said Shimizu's failure to clearly state that the workers needed to battle the crisis would remain led to the conclusion reached by many government officials that the utility wanted to evacuate all of its workers.Early on March 15, Shimizu called Nobuaki Terasaka, then director-general of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and said, "We feel that evacuation might become a reality if the situation becomes much more severe." At that time, Shimizu never said the needed workers would remain at the site.However, when Shimizu was called to the prime minister's office at about 4 a.m. on March 15 and was asked about pulling out TEPCO workers, he said, "We have never considered such a possibility."Reporters for The Asahi Shimbun have gathered information about the exchange between TEPCO executives and government officials. Some of their articles have been translated into English under "The Prometheus Trap" heading.Sources have told The Asahi Shimbun that Shimizu called Kaieda and Edano on the night of March 14 to request the pullout of TEPCO workers.Tetsuro Ito, the deputy chief Cabinet secretary for crisis management, was told directly by a TEPCO official in the prime minister's office that the utility wanted to "abandon" the Fukushima No. 1 plant and "evacuate" from the Fukushima No. 2 plant, the sources said.Shimizu tried calling Kaieda's aide a number of times between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. on March 14. At that time, the core pressure in the No. 2 reactor at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant was rising and the situation was becoming precarious.After midnight on March 14, Shimizu called Edano.In a recent interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Edano said, "If they were only thinking about partial evacuation, there would have been no need to call me in the first place."Cabinet ministers told then Prime Minister Naoto Kan about TEPCO's request to evacuate its workers around 3 a.m. March 15.Having just awakened from a nap, Kan said: "Do they realize what could happen if they evacuated? That just cannot be allowed to happen."Shortly thereafter, Kan summoned Shimizu to the prime minister's office and told him, "Evacuation is just not possible."Shimizu replied, "Yes, I understand."Kaieda and others in attendance were stunned at Shimizu's immediate acceptance of Kan's warning, the sources said.Edano was recently asked about the central government panel's interpretation that government officials had misunderstood what Shimizu had in mind.Edano said: "(At the time of the interim report) politicians had not yet been questioned so that is why it turned out that way. I am confident the contents will change by the time of the final report."
Another issue that will be examined is why the central government and TEPCO were unable to sufficiently grasp the extent of the accident as it was unfolding, particularly the state of the pool storing spent fuel rods in the No. 4 reactor building.The No. 4 reactor had stopped operations for periodic inspection when the Great East Japan Earthquake struck. For that reason, all nuclear fuel had been moved from the reactor core to the pool, meaning that the water temperature of the pool would increase at a faster rate. There were fears at first that the pool had in fact dried up.The central government's headquarters to deal with the nuclear accident raised such concerns at a meeting held from 4:40 p.m. on March 16, 2011.A summary of minutes from the meeting has Kan saying, "The temperature of the No. 4 reactor pool is rising, and the situation is worrisome."At the same time, notes that were used to compile the summary have Kan saying: "The pool in the No. 4 reactor has reached the boiling point. It is empty. Heat was given off and caused a fire."In an interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Kan said: "The fact that the water temperature in the pool was rising means there was water in it. After having said that, I would never say there was no water in the pool."But the failure of government officials to compile accurate minutes of that meeting will make it difficult to determine what exactly was said.(This article was compiled from reports by Hideaki Kimura, Kiyoshi Okonogi and Hisashi Hattori.)To read a commentary by Senior Staff Writer Keiji Takeuchi on the issue, visit: * * *The following are some of The Asahi Shimbun stories on the Fukushima nuclear disaster.(1) Investigations into Fukushima accident disagree on key points
(2) The Prometheus Trap/ 5 days in the Prime Minister's Office
(3) INTERVIEW/ YOICHI FUNABASHI: Fukushima nuclear crisis revealed Japan's governing defects