Recorded exchanges between staff at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant and officials at Tokyo Electric Power Co. headquarters offer stark vignettes of repeated human error and a grimly farcical hunt for supplies such as car batteries, as Japan's worst-ever nuclear accident disintegrated into a veritable man-made disaster.
Recorded exchanges between staff at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant and officials at Tokyo Electric Power Co. headquarters offer stark vignettes of repeated human error and a grimly farcical hunt for supplies such as car batteries, as Japan's worst-ever nuclear accident disintegrated into a veritable man-made disaster.
Reactors No. 1, 2 and 3 overheated and their fuel melted down; explosions destroyed equipment and buildings; and a fuel storage pool at the No. 4 reactor building became dangerously unprotected.
In August 2012, TEPCO released recordings of company teleconferences. The following blow-by-blow account is based on transcripts of those conversations.
They show how time was lost as slow reactions by TEPCO officials belied the urgency of events unfolding. Attempts to secure supplies lacked strategy. And some of the demands company managers made of on-site staff were unreasonable, at best.
(All professional titles and names of organizations are presented below in their correct form as of March 2011.)
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One of the reasons why the meltdown could not be averted was that No. 3 reactor's pressure vessel high-pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) had stopped working. The plant manager did not know this until 70 minutes later.
Masao Yoshida, general manager of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant and a central figure throughout this account, reported the halt of the HPCI at 3:52 a.m.
"Um, there's been a change at the No. 3 unit, so I'm reporting it. It's the HPCI. It stopped working once at 2:44 a.m."
A later investigation found that the HPCI actually halted at 2:42 a.m. on March 13.
The pressure inside the reactor had risen more than fivefold, rendering regular fire hoses useless for pumping water into the reactor. A boric acid solution injector would have been a satisfactory alternative to the HPCI, but its power cable had been damaged and was unusable. Therefore, before coolant could be injected, the internal pressure would need to be eased by venting the reactor containment vessel.
But at 5:23 a.m., a plant worker told Yoshida that venting would be delayed: "I'm so sorry, Mr. Yoshida, so sorry. In order to open the venting valves, we must change the cylinder immediately, and this will take about half an hour."
The venting valves were opened about half an hour after a core meltdown was reported at the Fukushima No. 1 plant.
By the time the main steam safety-release valves of the pressure vessel had been opened and water successfully pumped in using fire hoses, it was 9:20 a.m.
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TEPCO headquarters conveyed a directive it had received from the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency: "Since we think an explosion like the one that occurred at the No. 1 reactor is possible (at the No. 3 reactor), you might consider, for instance, opening the blowout panel (to let hydrogen escape)."
But TEPCO concluded at 1:36 p.m. that this would be difficult.
"We have considered opening the blowout panel, among other measures, but we have decided that would be difficult for physical as well as safety reasons."
From 2:45 p.m., ideas voiced on both sides--at TEPCO headquarters and at the Fukushima No. 1 plant--became more of random thoughts than constructive ideas. How would they open the blowout panel?
"One option could be to force it open from above, from a helicopter."
"I know this sounds pretty far-fetched, but how about we ask the Self-Defense Forces to use weaponry to blow up the panel?"
From the early evening of March 13, gasoline and water shortages became acute, and most of the discussions began to focus on how to secure new supplies.
From 10:40 p.m., the focus shifted to planned rolling blackouts. "I am being swamped with requests from government offices and everywhere, pleading to be exempted from the rolling blackouts. If we accommodate them, our plans to save power will simply collapse. So please, I must ask you all to be absolutely firm in turning down their requests."
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The water level in the No. 3 reactor had dropped below measurable levels, and all fuel rods inside were fully exposed.
Half an hour earlier, there had been signs of what to come.
The plant was running short of water, so the work to pump water into the reactor had to be suspended once. When the work resumed, the pressure inside the containment vessel proved too high, rendering the pumping difficult.
Yoshida reported: "The fact that the pressure is rising in the dry well (upper part of the containment vessel) means that, like at the No. 1 reactor, a hydrogen explosion is now a possibility. Even though we vented successfully yesterday and brought the pressure down, it's rising again. I'm saying we must monitor the situation very closely."
Repeated attempts were made to vent the containment vessel, but each time the venting valves closed again quickly.
At 11:01 a.m. on March 14, the video image showing the emergency response room at the Fukushima No. 1 plant, where a teleconference was in progress, shook violently and vertically.
Yoshida shouted 50 seconds later: "We've got a big problem. The No. 3 reactor just blew. Probably a steam explosion."
Then, at 12:50 p.m., the plant reported that the explosion at the No. 3 reactor had damaged the electric circuit for opening the venting valves on the No. 2 reactor.
Work then began in vain to get the No. 2 reactor valves to open. On March 15, that reactor began to spew a massive amount of radioactive materials.
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At 4:13 a.m. on March 13, a worker at the plant reported to TEPCO headquarters the difficulty of fixing the HPCI for injecting cooling water into the reactor: "We've tried to restart the HPCI, but perhaps because the battery is depleted, we can't restart it."
The HPCI's pump runs on steam generated inside the reactor, not on electricity. However, it needs electricity to start it, in the same way that a car needs a battery to turn on its engine.
"So you are waiting for power, is that it?" TEPCO headquarters asked.
The worker replied: "If only we had batteries ..." and added uncertainly, in a small voice, "… I suppose we could get the pump to work."
"Are we doing anything to get batteries?" Yoshida asked in a whisper.
Five seconds later, someone else yelled angrily: "It's useless. Useless. There's absolutely no point in scrambling for what we'll never get. Hey, you're just wasting your time."
Yoshida could only note: "We've got no choice but to think up Plan B."
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But here again, a lack of batteries shot down Plan B.
At 6:39 a.m. on March 13, Yoshida reported to TEPCO headquarters: "We've got a problem with this plan. The thing is, we just found out that the battery for opening the safety-release valves is dead. Unless we get a replacement battery, we can't depressurize the reactor."
"Have you got spare batteries?" headquarters asked.
"No, we haven't," Yoshida replied. "We're trying to get them now."
According to the report by the government's accident investigation panel, the Fukushima No. 1 plant had held no store of batteries to begin with. In the immediate aftermath of the March 11 quake and tsunami, workers removed five car batteries from site buses and TEPCO-owned cars, and used them to restore the water level meter of the No. 1 reactor.
On the morning of March 12, TEPCO headquarters placed an order with Toshiba Corp. for 1,000 car batteries. However, the vehicles that would deliver them to Fukushima Prefecture could not leave Tokyo for hours. The reasons included delays in obtaining a government permit to use expressways.
Opening the safety-release valves required 120 volts of electricity. Connecting 10 12-volt car batteries in series would have worked, but that number was unavailable at the plant on the morning of March 13.
At 7:05 a.m. on March 13, an announcement was made on the public address system in the plant's emergency response room: "Attention please, everyone! If you have driven to work in your own car, would you come to us with your car key. We would like to borrow your car battery as we don't have enough."
At 7:17 a.m., another announcement was made: "We are going out to buy some batteries, but we are short of cash. If anyone could lend us money, we would really appreciate it."
Twenty car batteries were removed from workers' cars, brought to the central control rooms for the No. 2 and No. 3 reactors, and plugged into the respective safety-release valve control panels.
In the meantime, employees went shopping in the city of Iwaki. They called at practically every discount store in the city, but were able to purchase only eight batteries.
At 9 p.m., the plant's power generation team reported on the situation at the No. 2 reactor.
"We are unable to confirm the reactor's water level. We checked to see why, and discovered that there is no power. The 10 car batteries connected in series are all dead."
At the time, water was being pumped into the No. 2 reactor by the reactor core isolation cooling system, which is an emergency cooling system that runs without electricity. But since there was no way to confirm directly how the system was working, nobody could tell when it might stop, so it was critically important to keep monitoring the water level.
"If we had 50 or 100 batteries, we should be able to monitor the water level. We must ask the procurement staff, as well as TEPCO headquarters, to help us get hold of batteries."
On March 14, the reactor core isolation cooling system failed, and the No. 2 reactor could no longer be cooled. The day before, 10 batteries had been brought to the reactor's central control room. Using their power, an attempt was made in the early evening of March 14 to open one safety-release valve, but it failed. It was the same with another valve. On a third try using different electric wiring, one valve finally opened. It was past 6 p.m., and the reactor core was already heating up like an empty kettle.
Between 8 and 9 p.m., 320 of the 1,000 car batteries ordered by TEPCO headquarters finally arrived at the Fukushima No. 1 plant.
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At 3:16 p.m. on March 13, it was reported during a teleconference that the radiation level at the central control room had reached 12 millisieverts per hour.
"This is not good at all," Yoshida muttered, 23 minutes later. "This is especially bad news for the No. 3 reactor, given what's been happening there. And since we probably should anticipate a hydrogen explosion at the No. 2 reactor, I've ordered all workers to evacuate."
"The No. 2 reactor's seawater injection line is still not working," he said. "To go there and get the line working again takes tremendous courage. But since we now know that the safety-release valves can be opened, I was just discussing with my people that it's time to put together a 'geezers' suicide squad.'"
At 5 p.m., it was reported that the No. 3 reactor had white vapor rising above it.
TEPCO Managing Executive Officer Komori expressed a growing sense of crisis. The No. 1 reactor building had exploded the day before. "This is very, very bad. Vapor began rising (from the No. 1 reactor) 30 minutes (before the explosion). We've only got 30 minutes (before the No. 3 reactor building goes)," he said.
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At 6:40 a.m. on March 14, Yoshida reported on the gravity of the situation at the No. 3 reactor.
"Since 6:10 this morning, the water level has fallen (to below the bottom of the fuel rods)," he said. "To put it bluntly, I'd say we may already be at a hypothetical accident level."
"There are many people in the vicinity of the plant, and a lot of people at the plant itself, too. Given the situation at hand, it may be time now to start thinking about what to do with these people, rather than about how we should proceed with our work."
At 11:01 a.m., an explosion occurred at the No. 3 reactor building.
Akio Takahashi, a TEPCO official, gave Yoshida an order: "Give us your radiation level readings quickly so we can determine whether we need to evacuate you."
TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu wondered aloud: "What happened? Haven't we found out yet?"
At 7:20 p.m., the technical team at the Fukushima No. 1 plant predicted imminent damage to the No. 2 reactor. At 8:22 p.m., a core meltdown would begin. And two hours later, the reactor's pressure vessel would be damaged. There was less than three hours left to deal with the situation.
Senior TEPCO officials began seriously discussing evacuation. "You've got to start setting the conditions for evacuation," Komori said. "There will be a terrible mess unless you make a judgment call on whether or not the plant workers should remain in the central control room."
"I hear you," said TEPCO Executive Vice President Sakae Muto. "Let's do it."
Takahashi was sitting beside TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata. "We've exhausted our options," Takahashi said.
"What?" Katsumata exclaimed, obviously not expecting this.
TEPCO headquarters told the plant what it must do ahead of the evacuation. "If you evacuate while you are still unable to open the vents, the resultant situation will be extremely difficult to control. Therefore, please complete your work on the vents."
The headquarters continued: "Here's an interim report on what is being considered. Evacuation should begin one hour before (expected damage to the No. 2 reactor pressure vessel). We are thinking that you should start preparing for evacuation 30 minutes before (you leave)."
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With the likelihood of a reactor explosion hanging over them, TEPCO headquarters stressed: "We want you to leave the plant after the pressure inside the reactor has been lowered."
TEPCO official Takahashi said: "What's the time of evacuation, or withdrawal, from the plant? Did we tell them to set the conditions of evacuation? Mr. Muto, around what time is everyone supposed to leave the plant?"
Someone from headquarters replied: "They can all leave after successful venting."
Around 8 p.m., cooling water was pumped into the No. 2 reactor.
TEPCO Chairman Katsumata, who had been out of the room, returned to his seat and asked Takahashi: "What happened? Did the water go in?"
"The water went into the No. 2 reactor around 8 p.m., just a minute or two ago," Takahashi replied.
"Ah. But perhaps it's too late?" Katsumata said.
Takahashi then asked: "All the people who right now are at the 1F (Fukushima No. 1 plant) are going to evacuate to the visitor hall of the 2F (Fukushima No. 2 plant), am I correct?"
Naohiro Masuda, general manager of the Fukushima No. 2 plant, interjected: "We are setting up two emergency response rooms, one for our No. 2 plant and the other for use by people from the No. 1 plant. I ask the (TEPCO) headquarters not to confuse the two."
With that, it was decided that emergency response functions would be effectively transferred from the Fukushima No. 1 plant to the Fukushima No. 2 plant.
TEPCO President Shimizu, who had been frequently leaving his seat to make calls on his mobile phone, said, "I am in the process of confirming our plans with the appropriate parties."
The situation appeared to be improving. But around 9:20 p.m., pressure in the No. 2 reactor's containment vessel began to rise. Unless the vessel was vented quickly, the danger of the reactor itself blowing up was becoming very real.
As for its evacuation plans, TEPCO insists on its website that it told the prime minister's office of its intention to discuss them: "Given the critical nature of the situation at the Fukushima No. 1 plant, it will eventually become necessary to consider evacuating non-essential staffers from the plant temporarily."
But the teleconference tapes show no one, not even TEPCO President Shimizu, making remarks that can corroborate TEPCO's claim that it had planned to evacuate "non-essential staffers temporarily."
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At 11:10 p.m. on March 12, TEPCO official Takahashi instructed the headquarters as well as the Fukushima No. 1 and No. 2 plants to submit their night-shift plans.
After some silence, Yoshida replied, "I'm a bit too beat to prepare them now."
Earlier that day, a hydrogen explosion had occurred at the No. 1 reactor building, and the plant had been like a battlefield as frantic efforts continued into the night to pump seawater into the reactor.
But Takahashi persisted. "You don't have to prepare anything elaborate. All I need are some phone numbers we can call. Why, even just your phone number would do."
"Well then, I'll think of what I can do," Yoshida replied.
A minute later he started sounding off.
"Listen. The 1F is in the 20-kilometer evacuation zone, and so probably is the 2F. That means none of our workers can go home anyway. It's just a question of whether they are awake or asleep. I'll give you the phone numbers of those who are relatively likely to be awake, so you can call them if you really need to. But I'm telling you, this is pretty much the situation here now."
At TEPCO headquarters, all workers except a handful had been permitted to go home. Nobody answered Yoshida.
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At 6:45 a.m. on March 13, preparations were under way at the Fukushima No. 1 plant to pump seawater into the No. 3 reactor. "Isn't your decision to pump seawater a bit too hasty?" questioned the prime minister's office.
Yoshida told the teleconference: "The point raised is that since the use of seawater is tantamount to scrapping the reactor, we should consider doing anything we can to use fresh water or filtered water instead."
"But we haven't got any fresh water," someone at the Fukushima No. 1 plant said.
TEPCO headquarters remained silent.
An employee at the plant said: "Per your instruction, we will start pumping filtered water wherever we can. But this will delay the start of the pumping work."
The process of switching from seawater to filtered water took half an hour or so.
Yoshida also bore the brunt of demands by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, as TEPCO headquarters repeatedly dumped the agency's orders and questions on him.
"The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency wants to know about our decisions on venting," the headquarters said. "Specifically, the question is why we decided that the reactor had been vented successfully."
An exasperated Yoshida replied: "Venting occurred simply because the rupture disc (a safety valve that opens when the containment vessel's internal pressure rises) opened."
Workers at the plant were busy checking rises in radiation levels in the atmosphere after the venting, and, thanks to the venting, were preparing to pump water into the No. 3 reactor. They simply had no time to answer inane questions.
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It was feared that the hydrogen explosion at the No. 3 reactor building could have damaged the fire hose for pumping water into the No. 2 reactor. Nevertheless, a worker at TEPCO headquarters declared that preparations to pump seawater into the No. 2 reactor were "complete."
This infuriated Yoshida. "Our on-site people are still checking (to see if the hose is usable), and we have not heard from them yet. Things are not all well and fine here, and I just want you to stop saying that."
As feared, not only the hose but also the fire engine itself had been damaged beyond repair.
Overnight, the pressure inside the No. 2 reactor's pressure vessel rose sharply. More instructions from headquarters, which were already too numerous, kept flooding in.
When the orders began to focus on matters that had nothing to do with keeping the crippled reactors under control, like what to do about the delivery of light oil and generators, Yoshida hotly demanded that workers at the headquarters directly contact their counterparts at the plant.
At 10 p.m., headquarters asked him how much water was being pumped into each reactor.
Yoshida had had it. He yelled in fury: "We don't have any brainy people around here. You keep pestering us with random questions. Just don't expect us to give you the answers you want!"
(This article was written by Toshihiro Okuyama, Hideaki Kimura and Takashi Sugimoto.)