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After surviving the explosion at the No. 3 reactor of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant on March 14, 2011, Col. Shinji Iwakuma, a unit commander within the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, headed for the central government's off-site command post.
First, Iwakuma had to undergo the decontamination process in the building next door. But he was fortunate to have escaped injury in the blast.
One of his unit members suffered a cracked spine, which would require one month to heal. Three other personnel suffered bruises. It was only later that Iwakuma learned that the unit member who was exposed to the highest radiation level totaled an exposure of 27.4 millisieverts.
After entering the off-site center, located five kilometers southwest of the plant, where a local response headquarters had been established to deal with the nuclear accident, Iwakuma was checked for radiation a number of times at the entrance. Even after showering eight times, he was unable to completely rid his body of radioactive materials.
A worker who was handling the radiation measurement suggested to Iwakuma that he wear protective gear, not to protect him from further exposure, but to prevent him from bringing the radioactive materials into the center.
Tables were arranged in a U-shape fashion in a large conference room. Iwakuma sat in the seat reserved for the individual with the least authority. The meeting began with six to seven participants, including Motohisa Ikeda, the senior vice minister of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, who was serving as head of the local response headquarters.
In addition to the protective gear, Iwakuma also wore slippers reserved for patients at a medical facility. He was the only one at the meeting dressed in that manner.
Officials of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and Tokyo Electric Power Co. spoke in a businesslike manner. While there was a brief mention of the explosion at the beginning of the meeting, most of the discussion focused on the situation at the reactor core and how to cool it.
Iwakuma was the last one allowed to speak.
He had spent many years in research and development of chemicals. His slim frame and the glasses he wore gave him the appearance of a quiet scholar. So, he took the others by surprise when he said in a stern tone, "It was my subordinates who were injured. Did you know beforehand that an explosion was possible or did it occur because of an error in how things were handled? Tell me which is it!"
Silence fell over the meeting.
The meeting ended without any reply to Iwakuma's question.
Immediately thereafter, a TEPCO official ran up to Iwakuma and bowed.
"I am truly sorry for the terrible thing that has happened," the official said.
The decision to have Iwakuma and his unit head for the No. 3 reactor was made earlier that morning.
Ikeda made the request. "The situation is one which requires water to be pumped in immediately," he said. "The Self-Defense Force is the only one we can ask."
Before leaving for the reactor, Iwakuma asked TEPCO officials about the situation at the reactor. Although the details were unclear and radiation levels were high, a TEPCO official would guide the unit. The explanation was also made that workers were still at the site.
That led Iwakuma to conclude that the possibility of an explosion was low. Because of the urgency of the matter, his unit headed to supply water in a lightly equipped vehicle.
According to a recording of a TEPCO teleconference that was only released much later, white haze had formed at the No. 3 reactor from the afternoon of March 13, 2011. Because a similar chain of events occurred at the No. 1 reactor before an earlier explosion there, TEPCO officials were on the alert for an explosion at the No. 3 reactor.
However, that important piece of information was never given to Iwakuma.
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