The U.N. nuclear watchdog squarely puts the blame for the Fukushima nuclear crisis on the plant operator’s inadequate preparations against natural disasters and severe accidents.
The U.N. nuclear watchdog squarely puts the blame for the Fukushima nuclear crisis on the plant operator’s inadequate preparations against natural disasters and severe accidents.
Tokyo Electric Power Co. failed to carefully consider the risks of an earthquake and tsunami in advance, the International Atomic Energy Agency states in its latest report.
Although it had been estimated before the accident that a possible magnitude-8.3 quake off Fukushima would spawn a 15-meter tsunami, for example, TEPCO had not taken any steps to protect against such an event. In fact, the utility had estimated the highest possible tsunami at just 5.7 meters.
On March 11, 2011, towering tsunami waves measuring up to 15.5 meters smashed into the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant following the magnitude-9.0 Great East Japan Earthquake.
The IAEA will hold a meeting in June on the report, which was compiled by about 180 experts from 42 countries. It is then expected to formally present the document to its members at its plenary session in September.
The report begins with IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano pointing out TEPCO had insufficiently prepared for a major earthquake leading to a nuclear accident.
He also notes that some factors behind the nuclear crisis are not unique to Japan, and that learning lessons from the Fukushima crisis and patiently ironing out problems is the key to a better safety culture.
The report also criticizes the now-dissolved Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, which told TEPCO to take protective measures against a massive tsunami in the future and not immediately.
As the Fukushima crisis progressed, meltdowns occurred at the No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 reactors at the plant. TEPCO had not considered a scenario in which the power supply and cooling functions would be lost simultaneously at more than one reactor, according to the report.
Also, while TEPCO had created a manual on how to respond to a severe accident, the company had not given workers proper training that would have enabled them to address the situation worsening over time. In addition, inadequate equipment was in place to deal with emergencies.
The report also lays into the Japanese government as its standards and policies in safety assessments and responses to severe accidents were at a lower level than in other countries.
And it says Japan had failed to formulate a plan to protect evacuating residents from radiation if a nuclear accident and a major natural disaster occurred simultaneously.
(This article was written by Toshio Kawada and Shunsuke Kimura.)