When the specter of meltdowns loomed at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in March 2011, the legal responsibility fell to Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator, to contain the crisis.
But as TEPCO employees became overwhelmed, Self-Defense Forces members and Tokyo firefighters were quickly sent to the site at the "request" of the prime minister.
Five years later, there is still no clear delineation of responsibility for the SDF and firefighters to be dispatched or to the extent of their involvement in the event of a nuclear emergency.
The government, the secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, which crafted new regulations for nuclear plants after the Fukushima disaster, the SDF and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, which oversees corps of firefighters across the nation, each has differing views.
“Our understanding is that operators of nuclear power plants are presumably prepared (to tackle a nuclear emergency) in line with the world’s most stringent regulations,” said a Defense Ministry official, referring to the nation’s new regulations. “We do not believe that SDF members will be able to do what goes beyond the capability of nuclear power plant operators.”
On March 11, the fifth anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, the government declared in a report after a meeting of Cabinet members related to nuclear energy that it will "bear the responsibility for dealing with" a nuclear accident.
The report mentioned the use of “tactical squads” such as the SDF and fire departments to address the situation.
However, what were described as their operation to contain an emergency in the report was “transportation of materials” and other efforts. It has yet to be determined as to what extent the SDF, fire departments and other squads should be prepared to help contain a nuclear contingency in terms of equipment and operations.
When the crisis unfolded at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant following the magnitude-9.0 quake and tsunami, a team of five Ground Self-Defense Force members in Koriyama, Fukushima Prefecture, was tasked with sending cooling water to the overheating No. 1 reactor on March 12, 2011.
The troops had to work amid rising radiation levels at the site, which was a quagmire from the mountain of wreckage left by the quake and tsunami. After the work was forced to be temporarily halted by the hydrogen explosion at the No. 1 reactor that day, the team had to return to work to inject cooling water into the reactor.
When it became obvious that TEPCO could no longer handle such a severe accident on its own, firefighters and police were also deployed to the plant to keep sending water into the reactors.
While the SDF sprayed water from above, firefighters, police and the SDF worked together to direct a spray from the ground.
The law on special measures concerning nuclear emergency preparedness, established in 1999, stipulates the responsibility for containing an emergency lies with the operator of a nuclear facility.
Under the current setup, even if an SDF unit or firefighters are deployed to the site, their activities are to be limited to offering “assistance” to workers grappling with the accident.
In April, the exposure limit to radiation of workers responding to a nuclear emergency will be raised to 250 millisieverts from 100 millisieverts, in light of the Fukushima disaster.
But the cap will only be applied to workers at a nuclear power plant as well as inspectors from the secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, not SDF members or firefighters.
According to the Defense Ministry, it does not envisage an operation to address a nuclear accident under its directives on responding to a nuclear disaster.
SDF members, in fact, have not conducted drills to deal with such an accident since the SDF’s fleet does not include a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier or similarly powered submarine. Japan does not possess nuclear weapons, either.
The government’s Fire and Disaster Management Agency, too, is reluctant to take on the responsibility.
The new regulations concerning nuclear facilities, which took effect in 2013, require plant operators to have in place a number of fire trucks tasked with sending water to reactors in the event of an accident.
“It is clear that plant operators are now capable of carrying out the kind of work that firefighters were involved in the Fukushima accident,” said an agency official.
In the Fukushima disaster, the deployment of SDF members and firefighters was based on the request from the prime minister, who heads a task force on responding to a nuclear disaster.
Although the Defense Ministry and Fire and Disaster Management Agency keeps a distance from a deployment of their members in the event of a future nuclear accident, the NRA’s secretariat does not.
“If a contingency gets out of the control of the operator, the government might be forced to get involved to contain the accident,” said an official with the NRA secretariat.
(This article was written by Tomoya Ishikawa and Tomoyoshi Otsu.)