RIETI - Quantitative Analysis of Dynamic Inconsistencies in Disaster Prevention Infrastructure Improvement: An example of coastal levee improvement in the city of Rikuzentakata

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Item Description
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is considered as an effective means to avoid the government's failures of public projects. However, once CBA becomes mandatory and residents expect a public project to be established based upon it, there is the potential for a dynamic inconsistency problem to arise. Taking as an example the coastal levee improvement policy in the city of Rikuzentakata in Japan, the present study clarifies the mechanism behind the dynamic inconsistency problem that is attributable to mandatory CBA and also discusses quantitatively the influence of the dynamic inconsistency problem on social welfare. In addition, through examining the quantitative result, we indicate that, in the projects where the improvement cost increases gradually with the scale, the inefficiency of the dynamic inconsistency problem is incurred on a larger scale.
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35.6714026, 139.7519849
Location(text)
Tōkyō-to, Chiyoda-ku, Kasumigaseki, 1 Chome−3−1
Latitude
35.67140260000001
Longitude
139.75198490000002
Location
35.67140260000001,139.75198490000002
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RIJS
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KH
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One Page
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Verified
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English
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English Title
RIETI - Quantitative Analysis of Dynamic Inconsistencies in Disaster Prevention Infrastructure Improvement: An example of coastal levee improvement in the city of Rikuzentakata
English Description
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is considered as an effective means to avoid the government"s failures of public projects. However, once CBA becomes mandatory and residents expect a public project to be established based upon it, there is the potential for a dynamic inconsistency problem to arise. Taking as an example the coastal levee improvement policy in the city of Rikuzentakata in Japan, the present study clarifies the mechanism behind the dynamic inconsistency problem that is attributable to mandatory CBA and also discusses quantitatively the influence of the dynamic inconsistency problem on social welfare. In addition, through examining the quantitative result, we indicate that, in the projects where the improvement cost increases gradually with the scale, the inefficiency of the dynamic inconsistency problem is incurred on a larger scale.
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http://wayback.archive-it.org/7472/20160601000000/http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/13090001.html
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http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/publications/summary/13090001.html