Militaries have played an important role in various aspects of disaster relief
operations, such as transportation, communication, medical care, food and water
supply, and infrastructure reconstruction. However, the Great East Japan Earthquake
was a “complex disaster” 2 consisting of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident,
which required a response that went beyond the conventional framework of the
disaster relief mission of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The SDF established
a Joint Task Force and called up Ready Reserves and Reserves for the first time in
its history. More than 100,000 personnel were deployed for disaster relief activities,
which was the largest-scale mobilization of the SDF. At the same time, the SDF
cooperated with foreign partners: the U.S., which carried out Operation Tomodachi,
and Australia, which engaged in airlift operations using large-scale transport
aircrafts, to name a few. The role that the SDF played in this unprecedented crisis is
often referred to as being “the last line of defense.”
The role of the military in the response to a major natural disaster is diverse
and is influenced by the “strategic culture” of the contributing countries. A report
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published under
the entrustment of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) states that, “One of the key variables that influence contributing
countries’ policies on sending military assets for IDRA (international disaster relief
assistance) is their national strategic culture, which relates to the perceived and
actual role of the military in the society and the world.” 3 Similarly, a report of the
Wilton Park Conference points out that while some countries call for civil-military separation in disaster response, others have a successful record of civil-military
coordination.4 In this context, how can the SDF’s domestic and international disaster
relief activities be assessed? What role should it assume in the disaster-prone Asia-
Pacific region, where the affected governments sometimes fail to provide necessary
assistance? The humanitarian assistance principle that the military is a means of the
“last resort” in the response to natural disasters is widely understood, also in Japan.
In some instances, however, the military becomes the first responder. In the wake of
the Great East Japan Earthquake, as many as 107,000 SDF personnel were engaged
in the relief operations. These operations, instead of prompting fears among the local
population, provided stability on site to the residents.5 The aim of this paper is to
shed light on how this phenomenon should be understood.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the debate
on the role of the military in natural disaster response. In this section, the background
of the “last resort” concept is examined, namely, that military capabilities and assets
should be used only as a “last resort” in humanitarian assistance operations. Section
2 looks at how the SDF’s disaster relief missions have been assessed in Japan, and
as a case example, reviews the SDF’s operations in the wake of the Great East Japan
Earthquake. This section shows that while some countries in the post-Cold War
era position disaster relief as a “new mission,” disaster relief missions in Japan are
commonly seen as being part of the SDF’s mission. Section 3 presents the example
of the Japan-U.S. partnership in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake
and examines how disaster response may impact the management of alliances.
<p>Tomonori Yoshizaki, Drector of Security Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NDIS), provides a Japanese perspective on the role of the military in humanitarian assitance and disaster response (HA/DR). The role of the JSDF in what was an unprecedent disaster on 3/11has been viewed by many as the “last line in defense.” The military response to a national disaster is heavily influenced by the strategic culture of participating nations. And while such a “last resort” mission is understood in Japan, disaster releif is actually considered part of the JSDF’s mission whereby civil-military separation is replaced by civil-military coordination. An amazing 97.7% of respondents in 2012 said they appreciated the role of the JSDF in disasters, and 91.7% of respondents said they had a positive impression of the JSDF. Yoshizaka examines the JSDF in terms of its strategic culture related to HA/DR, its deployment in response to 3/11, and its response to the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power station. Indeed, the joint operations between JSDF and U.S. forces became a symbol of <i>kizuna</i> (bonds of friendship) and was demonstrated through multiple ways at state and operational levels, and through Operation TOMADACHI. While the use of the military as part of HA/DR poses some dilemmas, it is Yozhisaki’s view that such “non-traditional” missions are considered standard for the JSDF, they will continue to serve as a public good in the uncertain Asia-Pacific region, and they will be a source of soft power for Japan.</p>