Great Eastern Japan Earthquake: “Lessons Learned” for Japanese Defense Policy
The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake (GEJE) on March 11, 2011 was the worst disaster in the nation’s recorded history. The triple combination of an earthquake, tsunami, and meltdown of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station dealt a severe blow to northeastern Japan, resulting in the largest and fastest mobilization of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) since its establishment in 1954 and unprecedented cooperative relief activities with the US armed forces.
Within 72 hours of the earthquake, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) mobilized the JSDF and activated its reserve units. Additionally, the JSDF established a Joint Task Force (JTF) in order to coordinate the relief activities by Ground, Air, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, with Lt. General Eiji Kimizuka as JTF commander, and made Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff General Ryoichi Oriki ultimately responsible for operations related to the GEJE. At its operational peak, the JSDF mobilized 106,000 personnel to provide support for: (1) rescue and recovery, (2) transport assistance, (3) livelihood assistance, and (4) emergency rehabilitation assistance. Additionally, the JSDF troops helped cool the reactors and spent fuels, decontaminate the personnel and equipment, and monitor the radiation and temperature around Fukushima.
The US military also responded with a considerable show of force, initially under the leadership of United States Forces Japan (USFJ) commander Lt. General Burton Field, and subsequently under United States Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Patrick M. Walsh. Under their leadership, US military conducted Operation Tomodachi as the Joint Support Force (JSF). The US forces at its operational peak had 24 naval ships, 189 aircraft, and approximately 24,000 personnel supporting the disaster relief efforts. Specifically, the US offered key capabilities to the JSDF, including Marines that were specially trained for chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear (CBRN) response and UAVs to gather intelligence on the state of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station. The cooperative operations between the JSDF and the US military also led to the establishment of coordination cells known as Bilateral Coordination Action Teams (BCATs) in Ichigaya, Yokota, and Sendai.
The GEJE marked a series of firsts for the JSDF. It was the first time that the JSDF faced a “complex disaster (fukugou jitai).” It was also the first time that its three services had to work side-by-side in a real-time large-scale operation. It also marked the first time that the JSDF conducted a large- scale cooperative operation with the US military during a real emergency. The JSDF’s commendable efforts in the face of these challenges demonstrated the incredible strength of the JSDF and the US-Japan alliance. However, the unprecedented nature of this disaster response also generated a number of “lessons learned” as the JSDF and MOD consider the future of JSDF capabilities. Among
these “lessons learned,” several deserve to be highlighted:
<p>Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., performed a comprehensive analysis of the Great Japanese Earthquake in order to compile specific lessons learned in the following areas:</p><p><strong>Capabilities</strong></p><p>-The JSDF’s reliance on private section telecom infrastructure for C4ISR raised questions of survivability and highlighted the lack of a joint capability with repsect to C4ISR.</p><p>-JSDF transport and logistic capabilities were inadequate to support mobilization beyond a couple of months; joint transport/logistics capabilities and contractual relationships with private transportation companies should be pursued.</p><p>-Despite civilian control over nuclear over nuclear power, the MOD is not considered a stakeholder in nuclear safety; as demonstrated by the experience in Fukushima, that situation should change.</p><p><strong>Institution</strong></p><p>-Jointness among the JSDF services should be increased through amendments to the SDF Law that encourage incentives, and the Joint Staff Office should be reorganized, potentially recalibrating the role of Chief of Staff of Joint Staff.</p><p>-Reconsideration of an organization change with the GDSF, including the creation of Ground General Command (<i>rikujo soutai</i>), which had originally been considered as part of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in 2010.</p><p>-The JDSF should set up a sustainable process to care for its personnel suffering from PTSD and other emotional/emotional disorders resulting from high-stress missions.</p><p><strong>U.S.-Japan Cooperation</strong></p><p>-The U.S. and Japan should establish a process to remove limitations from the 1997 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for the Defense Cooperation that encourage bilateral defense coordination in the case of non-combat emergencies.</p><p>-Appropriate balance needs to be achieved with respect to the JSDF’s relationship with USFJ and PACOM during peacetime and contingent operations such as Operation TOMODACHI.</p>